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In his wide-scoped paper “Broadening “in situ” for improving argument evaluation?”, Prof. 
Koppang seeks to find a way to coordinate accounts for argument evaluation from both psychology 
of argumentation (PSA) and philosophy of argumentation (PHA).  
 Prof. Koppang presents PSA as a rather new discipline based on in vitro procedures, and 
focused on the analysis of small groups of individuals under controlled circumstances. The hold 
paradigm of argumentation, in relation to the objective that arguers are considered to pursue in PSA 
experiments, is persuasion. On the other hand, he presents PHA as a normative and theoretical 
discipline. Its characteristic methods are based on in vivo analysis (outside a lab).  
 I sympathize with Prof. Koppang’s contentions about integrating such a different disciplines 
in order to achieve an integrated way for assessing arguments. I really believe this is a good 
direction for opening a line of study which I believe is likely become rather fruitful. Besides, I find 
the procedure he follows in his paper appropriate. It is based on the separation of features from both 
fields of study which can exhibit points in common (like some insights about the treatment of 
fallacies, or the types of debates that lead to the justification of a conclusion), in a way that the 
integration of both disciplines is shown as quite direct. Also, he does not let unmentioned some 
other features (for instance, the relation with the lab) that without any doubt make both disciplines 
seem rather distant. Despite that deepening into this last part makes it harder to prove his thesis, 
Prof. Koppang shows it, and then integrates it into his whole setting. I think this is an honest and 
right way to proceed.  
 Although, I have some doubts about the theoretical background Prof. Koppang is using in 
relation with the concepts of ‘argumentation’ and ‘argument’. His paper is presented as dealing with 
argument evaluation. But when quoting Walton, Prof. Koppang states: 
 
Walton (2001) takes this even further, according to Schiappa, when he argues that as long as definitions 
are lodged into place in government regulations and law, they serve particular interests and are even 
coercive (ibid. p. 169). Hence, attempts to define reality should be treated as an argument open to critical 
questioning and counter-definitions. Here “argument” has a double meaning – both claim qua product and 
qua process (Schiappa & Nordin, 2014, p. 9). Moreover, the process of argumentation evaluation is 
essential if you want to know what works and not only consider what is right and are satisfied with what 
occurs (ibid. p. 151). 
The last part of the paragraph leaves me doubtful about which meaning of argument is being used 
along the paper. I am not sure if the considerations Prof. Koppang presents in his paper about 
evaluation are applied to the product of an argumentation or to the argumentation process itself. 
When Section 3 (PSA and argumentation evaluation) is presented in p. 2, Prof. Koppang states “I 
introduce the PSA and argument evaluation with brief reference to argument production in groups.”: 
Does he means argumentation (a communicative process) when he refers to “argument production”? 
And why is the section labelled as dealing with “argumentation evaluation” if it is described as 
dealing with “argument evaluation” and “argument production”? 
 There are some accounts of argumentation (PHA theories) that marks this difference, as 
Bermejo-Luque’s (2011)⁠. According to her, argumentations are second order speech-act complex 
composed of the constative speech-act of adducing (i.e., the reason) and the constative speech-act of 
concluding (i.e., the conclusion) (Bermejo-Luque 2011, pp. 60-62). The acceptance of the 
conclusion on the basis of the reasons adduced is grounded on an inference. Thus, arguments are 
representations of the syntactic and semantic properties of the inferences underlying argumentations 
(which are communicative processes). I think that using a theoretical account of argumentation like 
the one proposed would give more precision and internal coherence to Prof. Koppang’s work.  
 I understand that the actual objective of the paper could be put forward as “integrating PSA 
and PHA features in order to build a coordinated approach for argument evaluation”. I think that a 
necessary condition for achieving it should be a deep analysis of PSA and PHA settings for 
argument evaluation. But I believe that the PHA state-of-the-art about argument evaluation has not 
been fully described.  
 In Section 2, Prof. Koppang analyses the relation between logic and argumentative schemes 
versus the capability of several PHA accounts (Toulmin, Schiappa, Walton) for evaluating in situ 
arguments. Accordingly, a PHA notion for evaluating arguments emerge: good arguments seem to 
be those which exhibit good coherence with the context in which they are uttered: “[…] argument 
evaluation is dependent on definitions, context, needs and interest”. (p. 4) 
But there are more notions of PHA about argument evaluation, and some of them might 
accommodate better with the PSA setting that Prof. Koppang presents. Several PHA scholars define 
argumentation goodness with respect to several standards: persuasion to a universal audience, 
rational persuasion, etc. As Bermejo-Luque (2011, p. 14) summarizes: 
 
In order to promote a characterization of argumentation goodness […] Perelman proposed a definition of 
good argumentation as argumentation able to persuade a universal audience. For its part, Pragma-
dialectics characterized good argumentation as “argumentation able to resolve a difference of opinion”; 
and Johnson suggested that good argumentation is argumentation achieving the rational persuasion of its 
addressee. The linguistic-pragmatic approach that I endorse can be said to be epistemological in 
characterizing good argumentation as argumentation able to justify its target-claim. 
Maybe taking into account some of these standards would allow a better connection with the PSA 
account for evaluating arguments: persuasion. As Prof. Koppang states in p. 5: “M&S place the 
function of reasoning as argumentative, to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade” and 
in p. 1, “[…] the successful outcome of reasoning is the ability to persuade for action to adapt to 
specific situations”.  
 Nonetheless, Prof. Koppang has cleverly drawn a connection between PHA and PSA 
accounts of argument evaluation: fallacies. These are a fundamental feature of every PHA argument 
evaluation account. As van Eemeren, F. H., Garssen, B., Krabbe, E. C. W., Snoeck Henkemans, F., 
Verheij & Wagemans (2014, p. 25)⁠ state,  
 
Virtually every normative theory of argumentation […] includes a treatment of the fallacies. The degree 
to which a theory of argumentation makes it possible to give an adequate treatment of the fallacies can 
even be considered as a litmus test of the quality of the theory. 
Prof. Koppang points out how can PSA and PHA complement each other in order to achieve a 
coordinated approach to the study of fallacies and, consequently, to the study of argument 
evaluation. Despite the lack of interest he assures PSA gives to the analysis of fallacies, it is 
interesting how the study of confirmation bias can contribute to show that people are prone to argue 
fallaciously. Prof. Koppang illustrates this in p. 11: 
 
When the empirical research on the PSA shows that people are prone to fallacies as to production and 
evaluation of arguments (Wolfe, p. 92), it seems odd that it does not show interest in fallacies while aware 
of poor decisions. […] 
And in p. 6 he deepens into this aspect, as well as he outlines PSA procedures for argument 
evaluation:  
 
When people are asked to check out reasoning, they have a tendency to produce arguments depending on 
the conclusion. Thus, they are supporting or rebutting the argument and thereby engaged in a biased 
search for arguments. Yet, when people are supporting, they need less time compared to rebutting, which 
needs justification and more time. By looking for arguments contrary to their own conclusions people 
may find many weaknesses, and might function as procedure for circumventing confirmation bias under 
certain conditions, such as in the evaluation of arguments where this social mechanism and bias seems 
inactive. 
Prof. Koppang also studies the relations between the objective of the arguer (truth versus persuasion) 
and the quality of the resulting argument (in p. 9). I find it rather interesting and likely to relate with 
the concept of argumentation goodness (PHA). The consideration of the type of groups in which an 
argumentation takes place in relation with the quality of the argumentation is also pertinent and 
appropriate to connect with PHA: 
 
When people are organized in small groups primed for genuine debates while evaluating arguments in a 
lab they are after the truth. However, when people placed outside a lab are swayed by a skilled 
flimflammer playing on prejudices and mass communication, the mind seems reduced to a social 
instrument wherein critical thinking and evidence are circumvented. 
To sum up, I think the paper Prof. Koppang has written broadens the scope of argument evaluation, 
a typical PHA field which can be fruitfully complemented with PSA results about confirmation bias 
and fallacies. Maybe a deeper description of PHA theoretical approaches to the concepts of 
‘argumentation’, ‘argument’, ‘inference’ and ‘reasoning’ would increase the internal coherence of 
the text, as well as a deeper treatment of different PHA argument evaluation accounts. Despite of 
these criticisms, I am very sympathetic to Prof. Koppang’s idea of coordinating the best features of 
PHA and PSA in order to fulfill an integrated assessment of in situ arguments.  
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